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Abstract 
 
This study analyzes the gambling addiction in Taiwan by using lottery data from 
period 1978-1985.  Three main conclusions can be made from the empirical 
evidence of this study.  First, gambling is strongly addictive in Taiwan but it is solely 
backward looking and inconsistent with the theory of rational addiction.  Second, 
differences in gender, employment status, and educational background appear to have 
little impacts on consumers’ choices in addictive consumption.  Third, the long-run 
price elasticities of gambling are calculated with a range from –0.467 to –0.697. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Since Becker and Murphy (1988) developed the theory of rational addiction, 
many empirical studies have been done to investigate whether consumption of 
addictive goods are rational behaviors made by individuals who are fully 
acknowledge of the future adverse effects caused by present consumption.  Results 
from most of the empirical studies tend to support what Becker and Murphy’s theory 
has predicted on consumption of addictive goods.  In particular, evidences from the 
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cases of cigarette smoking, alcohol consumption and drug use appear to be consistent 
with the argument of rational addiction.  This paper intends to further examine the 
addictive behavior on gambling by estimating the short-run and long-run price 
elasticities from the demand function of lottery in Taiwan.  
 
2. Results and Discussion                         
           
 In this analysis, the most surprising finding is that the estimated coefficient of 
future consumption is statistically insignificant and, thus, the empirical evidence from 
the case of gambling in Taiwan is inconsistent with the model of rational addiction.  
Apparently, even though gambling is strongly addictive, most gamblers seem to 
ignore the future consequences of being addictive.  Addicts’ current behaviors are 
likely to be strongly affected by past consumption and current price and income but 
not the perception of what adverse consequences in the future might be caused by 
their current consumption of addictive goods.  Unlike drinking or smoking, which 
are concluded as rational addictions by numerous empirical evidences, addictive 
gamblers are myopic and do not react substantially to the expected changes in price.  
However, in the case of gambling, the long-run price elasticity is still much higher 
than the short-run price elasticity.  The long-run price elasticity of ranging 
from –0.467 to –0.697 is more than twice as large as the short-run price elasticity of 
ranging from –0.231 to –0.254.  In particular, when the instrumental variables 
include gender and educational background variables, and the payoff of lottery’s 
grand prize, the long-run price and income elasticities increase substantially.    
 
3. Conclusion and Evaluation 
 
 By employing Becker, Grossman, and Murphy’s empirical framework, the 
demand function for gambling in Taiwan is estimated with the lottery data from the 
period 1978-1985.  The empirical evidence from this research provides several 
important insights into gambling behavior.  First, with the estimated demand 
function, it is argued that gambling is addictive through the complementarity between 
past consumption and present consumption.  Given the positive and significant 
coefficient of lagged consumption from the estimation, the reinforcement of past 
consumption on present consumption is very strong.  That is, past consumption 
increases current consumption by raising the marginal utility of current consumption.  
Second, the result from this study is inconsistent with the theory of rational addiction.  
By testing the influences of future price and consumption on present consumption, the 
result suggests that future consumption does not have a significant impact on present 
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consumption, and therefore, gambling is a myopic addiction instead of a rational 
addiction.  Third, the estimated result does not differ substantially with the inclusion 
of a variety of demographic and socioeconomic variables, such as gender, 
employment status, and educational background in the instrumental variables.  
Consequently, differences in the selected demographic and socioeconomic features do 
not play an important role on determining the type of addictive consumption.  This 
implies that gambling is a myopic addiction with or without the consideration of 
demographic and socioeconomic variables.  Even some demographic and 
socioeconomic variables are often considered to have large influences in the 
formation of addiction, as numerous studies have suggested, they tend to have little 
impacts on increasing addicts’ rationality.  It is likely that gamblers are only 
backward-looking regardless of their demographic and socioeconomic characteristics.  
Nevertheless, the long-run price elasticity is considerably higher than the 
short-run price elasticity.  Since gambling addicts are not strongly responsive to 
future changes in prices, the permanent reduction in prices is unlikely to have a 
substantial positive effect on reducing the purchase of lottery tickets.  Surprisingly, 
the evidence from this study indicates that, unlike alcohol consumption and smoking, 
gambling addicts largely neglect the future adverse effects caused by the 
accumulation of past and current consumption. 
 Moreover, this analysis would be helpful in understanding the public policies 
intending to reduce gambling addiction.  Since gambling is myopically addictive, the 
legalization of gambling business associated with a current decrease in price will lead 
to an increase in current participation of gambling given that changes in current price 
have a strong negative effect on current consumption.  In contrast, policies 
attempting to reduce gambling by raising expected prices would not be effective as 
long as the addicts do not behave rationally.  In other words, the addicts are not very 
responsive to expected changes in prices because their current consumption decisions 
only depend on current price and income and past consumption but not future changes 
in prices.  Given that gambling is a myopic addiction, to legalize gambling business 
without improving the rationality of addicts seems to be inappropriate when gamblers 
do not take into account the future adverse consequences caused by the addiction.  
Therefore, providing education programs of addiction control and inducing consumers 
to consider the future adverse effects of being addictive to gambling are necessarily 
such that addicts may behave rationally and become responsive to changes in future 
prices.  In addition, regardless of the differences in gender and educational 
background, consumers behave myopically to gambling addiction.  While consumers 
behave myopically, the social cost of legalizing gambling business would be 
substantially large because of the reduction in prices and the strong effect of 
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accumulated past consumption on present consumption.  In Taiwan, if gambling 
business becomes legal, providing education programs to raise the rationality of 
conducting the addictive consumption should be necessary, and policies based on the 
long-run price elasticity may be favorable than those based on short-run price 
elasticity.  However, on the other hand, if the legalization of gambling business is 
solely based on maximizing the tax revenue from gambling, more attention should be 
paid to the relationship between the demographic characteristics of gamblers and the 
demand for gambling.  While the tax on gambling is considered as substantially 
regressive in most previous studies, the issue of equity would become more severe if 
the tax revenue counts as a greater proportion of government finance.    
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